The Merits of Overdriving End Strength and the Pitfalls of Falling Short
On Saturday August 12th 2017 in Arlington, Texas I had the privilege to formally interact with a select group of key leaders from the Texas Army National Guard Recruiting and Retention Command. The focal point of our discussion was End Strength.
The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2017 has raised the End Strength for the National Guard from 335k to 343k. This presents unique challenges and opportunities for the shaping of our force.
The ultimate aim of our brilliant team of recruiters (talent scouts) is to be the front in attracting and enlisting the top quality applicants to fill the ranks of our force structure. Readiness continues to be our ‘watch word’ as we perpetually measure our worth in public value by our ability to muster the right forces and apply them directly as needed for the President of the United States and the Governor of Texas.
The President delegates his authority to select and deploy units to Forces Command (FORSCOM) while the Governor of Texas delegates his power of mobilizing for state responses to the Texas Director of Emergency Management (TDEM). Therefore, if we are to enjoy continued resources provided by our Congress’s (both state and federal), then we best ensure these two key stakeholders view us as a credible asset. Unlike a corporate enterprise dependent largely on profit and loss statement, our value is held in the public trust and measured by performance during the toughest of times.
End Strength is but one metric of measurement. We need a ready population of talent, not just names on a Unit Manning Roster. The recruiter’s job is complicated by the fact that our Force Structure composition is never fully set. Who knows exactly what type of Soldier we will need in future years. It is largely a matter of guesswork.
Since states, like Texas, are different than the Active Component (AC). They do not enjoy an ability to PCS Soldiers to fill unforecasted needs of units who suddenly morph into something new. For example, if an IBCT located on Ft. Hood is told to transform into an ABCT then the MOS shortfalls can largely be attained through the PCS method. States, in contrast, must rely heavily on MOS conversions. This is challenging due to constrained budgets and the throughput at our army schools. Therefore it costs both money and time differently than AC counterparts. It is a fact unit readiness suffers acutely as a result of reorganizations.
The interaction and dialogue with the forum went on to discuss other unique differences between the NG and AC. We discussed ‘professionalism’ of our components and the varying views different groups may feel toward one component over another. I encouraged the group to avoid direct discussions with the AC about ‘who is more professional than who’. Instead, I encouraged them to change a professionalism comparison into a Cultural comparison.
The NG is unique culturally as most of their members are part-time. About 85% of their force is paid by the military not more than a couple of days a month and a few weeks a year. The other 15% is the full time force and they must exercise ‘persuasive’, ‘inspirational’ leadership in order to be successful. The majority of the members of the NG are not under UCMJ the majority of the time. I reflected on my own time in the AC and recounted how I could take my unit to the field for 5 days in order to accomplish a specific set of METL tasks. If the unit failed to meet the objectives I set forth, I could keep them in the field longer. This served as motivation for the unit to accomplish their tasks. In contrast, regardless of NG leader’s dismay with the performance of his/ her unit, they will go home at a prescribed time. The ‘want to’ get it done factor must be addressed more surgically by the NG leader. This ‘ask’ before ‘task’ mentality of NG leaders can often be misconstrued by AC leaders as a weakness or just plain odd. The point here is that differences of leadership style by component do not make one more professional over another. It simply is a product of their cultural and constructive design. Each leader is simply doing his/ her best to achieve better Readiness.
Finally we brought the conversation home by speaking to the symbiotic relationship of End Strength (ES), Force Structure Authorization (FSA) and Full Time Support (FTS).
The last difference we pointed out between the NG and AC is the Trainees, Transients, Holdees and Students (TTHS) account. The AC places about 13% of their members in this account in order to better differentiate their total number of members from their deployable population. The NG does not enjoy this bookkeeping principle. Therefore leaders are forced to explain again and again why straight-line comparisons of individual readiness between an AC unit and a NG unit do not match up.
So, the first and most important reason Texas must recruit End Strength above Force Structure Authorization (FSA) is to ensure their MTOE units are as prepared for combat operations as their AC counterpart. It is a true Readiness issue. There is no doubt.
An optimal End Strength percentages above FSA is 4% overall. I challenged them all to dispute me. There is no perfect equation. In fact I would argue that it would be unethical to recruit and retain above FSA if the NG had a true TTHS account.
Closing our discussion on Readiness as our measure of public value, we discussed the ratio between FSA, ES and FTS. One cannot and should not be addressed independently. They are mutually supporting personnel metrics each reliant on another in order for unit leaders to be capable of meeting Readiness targets.
ES above FSA is only useable if the FTS is also made available to care for the force. Units are not designed to care for more members than they are authorized. Careers are stifled and school quotas are backlogged. Morale suffers as a consequence and retention suffers. When retention performance is poor, the taxpayer bears the brunt. Incentives have to be energized for more accessions and the whole shenanigan repeats itself.
When Texas, and any state is able to recruit and retain quality members above its FSA then this becomes a valuable instrument in leveraging more FSA and FTS for itself. Whenever FSA and FTS run in concert with ES, Readiness becomes sustainable and the nation’s military more powerful. It’s just sound bookkeeping.
— COL Darrell W Dement
Sir, admittedly this read took me out of my comfort zone nearly from beginning to end however, that did not detract from my level of interest. Fortunately for me, in my current duty assignment (BN S3 transitioning into XO and FTUS BN OIC for 1-143 IN (A)), the intricasees related to the Texas Army National Guard’s FSA, ES and FTS do not warrant the majority of my attention. With that said, I still believe that having a healthy understanding and appreciation for that level of strategic management is value added and key to my professional development as a field grade officer within the TXARNG formation.
As a key leader with the 143rd (an associated unit of the 173rd IBCT (A)) I certainly have an apprectioation for all the work done by the members of our recruiting and retention team. If it wasn’t for them, our unit would be dead in the water. They work tirelessly to help the airborne battalion stay full of highly motivated Paratroopers, and for that we are extremely grateful.
Your point related to the cultural comparisons of the AC and NG definitely grabbed my attention. As someone who spends a great deal of time conversing with our AC counterparts I have a deep understanding of this interesting dichotomy. Yet, no matter how many times I explain the prerogative of the NG leader to an AC leader, I never rarely if ever feel a reciprocation of full understanding. At least that was the case until recently. As you know, part of the associated unit program involves a liaison officer and liaison NCO (LNOs) swap. As such the 143rd has the distinct pleasure of now having two active component members within our formation (1 x O3 and 1 x E7). As with any new member of the organization, we have done our best to welcome these two fine Paratroopers the we can. We spend much time explaining to them the differences between the AC and the NG however there is only so much explaining you can do. At some point, you just have to sit back and let them learn through experience. Watching them reach different points of realization associated with how we do business is awesome. Whether it be related to the amount of time we actually have with our Soldiers or the amount of additional time our key leaders poor in to the unit in an ‘un paid’ status, our LNOs continue to be impressed and amazed at the uniqueness of the NG.
Jokingly, whenever one of these moments of realization is embarked upon we (the FTUS personnel) like to remind our AC LNOs ‘The Guard is Hard’. There are so many things that the AC leader simply takes for granted that the NG leader must work through on a continual basis. However, juxtapose to that is the level of expectations associated with the AC that the NG gets more leniency on. Whether it be the dictated time a Platoon stays qualified after conducting a live fire exercise (6 months for AC, 1 year for NG) or the amount of time it takes to recall and deploy a formation, the AC is typically held to a higher standard (understandable).
None the less, the one thing I feel both the AC and NG leader have in common and must focus on above all else is the retention of quality Soldiers. Although many differences do exist when comparing the military and the civilian business sector, there is one irrefutable similarity. Both organizations save time and money through the retention of quality individuals. If we as leaders can do a better job patching up that hole in the boat, our recruiters can slow down on the rate in which they have to bail the water. I know, that briefs well and it’s easier said than done. This is true, but I feel strongly that many of our fine Soldiers are looking for reasons to stick around. Through strong but fair leadership, education of all the great benefits and tough realistic training (among other things), I think we can do a better job keeping them in the ranks. It’s what keeps me motivated day in and day out, retaining and training the future leaders of this amazing organization.
Thanks for the great read sir, look forward to seeing more in the future.
Respectfully
MAJ Jason Cordaway
Airborne!